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I. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality and a coalition of leading bar associations -the Asian Bar
Association ofWashington (ABAW), the South Asian Bar Association of
Washington (SABAW), and Washington Women Lawyers (WWL).
Amici are dedicated to advancing the fair administration of justice and
removing barriers to minority participation and access to the justice
system. Detailed amici statements of interest are attached to this brief as
Appendix A, and a motion requesting leave to file this brief has been filed
simultaneously.

II.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT

Amici curiae fully support the position of the Respondents in this
case who urge that the trial court's order for a new trial be upheld.
However, Amici submit that further argument is necessary regarding the
prejudicial nature and effects of the comments made by the jurors, as well
as the potential impact on minorities in the legal profession and their
clients. First, we place the prejudicial remarks in a historical context.
Second, we draw from social science to understand better both the nature
and effect of prejudicial remarks, concluding that the nature and effect of
the remarks in this case reflect bias that likely tainted the outcome.
Finally, we argue that a remedy is necessary not just for fairness in this
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particular case, but also because racism that infects jury deliberations, if
left unchecked, would strongly hinder diversity in the legal profession.
III. ARGUMENT

This case involves unacceptable racist behavior by jurors that
reflected and created bias, and that has great implications for the state of
minorities in the legal profession. The right to a new trial because of
unacceptable jury bias has already been established in Washington. See,
e.g., Allison v. Dep't ofLabor and Indus., 66 Wn.2d 263,265,401 P.2d
982 (1965); Mathisen v. Norton, 187 Wn. 240, 60 P.2d 1 (1936). This
right should be extended to cases of overt racist behavior by juries directed
against a minority attorney.
The jurors had been "questioned extensively" regarding any
potential biases or prejudices that might have influenced their ability to act
as jurors. (CP 44.) All unequivocally stated that they could be fair and
objective. Id. Yet two jurors came forward after the trial and swore in
affidavits that other jurors had repeatedly referred to plaintiffs counsel, a
Japanese American named Mark Kamitomo, as "Mr. Miyashi," "Mr.
Miyagi," and "Mr. Kamikaze," (CP 50-51, 109) smirking and chuckling
all the while (CP 309). In addition, one also swore that another juror
stated that, given the date was December 7th, Pearl Harbor Day, a racially
derogatory reference was "almost appropriate." (CP 113.) Both of the
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forthcoming jurors stated that the comments were derogatory and
demonstrated racial bias toward Mr. Kamitomo. (CP 76-77, 112-113.)
Petitioners' argument that such comments are not offensive or do
not indicate racial bias fail to understand the historical context invoked by
the comments and the nature and effect of the prejudicial remarks. We
urge the Court to recognize the significant harm and uphold the trial court
order granting a new trial, because unchecked juror bias will have a strong
negative impact on fairness in individual cases, as well as on minority
lawyers, diversity in the legal profession, and access to legal
representation in underserved communities.

A.

The Jurors' Statements Must Be Viewed in the
Context of the History of Discrimination Against
Japanese Americans in the United States and the
State of Washington.

The jurors' jokes and comments reflect our nation's unfortunate
history of discrimination against Japanese Americans and minorities. One
juror's racist remark in this case went so far as to approvingly link
disparagement of Mark Kamitomo to the attack by the Japanese military
on Pearl Harbor, an event that precipitated one of the darkest eras in our
country's past: nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans were removed from
their homes on the West Coast and incarcerated in desolate camps
surrounded by barbed wire. Japanese Americans and other Asian
Americans in the past have faced discriminatory citizenship laws, violence
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and social ostracization, economically discriminatory laws, and
educational hurdles, and these struggles inform the present-day context of
racism against such minorities.
Much of the discrimination and political powerlessness suffered by
Asian Americans came from U.S. citizenship rules. The first
naturalization statute limited naturalization to "free white persons."
Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. After the Civil War, the
right to naturalize was extended to permit persons of African descent to
become citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 359 (1875). This left Chinese and other
East Asians, South East Asians, and South Asians as the only peoples
ineligible for American citizenship. See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260
U.S. 178 (1922); Thind v. United States, 261 U.S. 204 (1923). Inability to
naturalize was, until Congress changed the law in 1952, the heaviest legal
burden resident alien Japanese Americans had to bear. See McCarranWalter Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1952) (eliminating racial bar to
naturalization). Lack of citizenship prevented them from voting and
holding office, and state statutes prescribed American citizenship as a
prerequisite for attorneys and a myriad of other professions and trades. See
Milton R. Konvitz. The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law (1946).
In Washington's early history as a Territory and State, immigrants
from Asia constituted the largest non-White group that settled in the area.
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First the Chinese came in the late 1800s, then the Japanese in the early
1900s, and then the Filipinos in the 1920s. See Calvin F. Schmid et al,
Nonwhite Races: State of Washington at 10 (1968). Each of these Asian

immigrant groups faced hostility from Whites, but the most extreme
violence was directed against the Chinese. See generally Doug Chin,
Seattle's International District: The Making of a Pan-Asian American
Community (2001 ). In one particularly egregious incident in 1886, 350

Chinese persons, nearly all the Chinese in Seattle, were forcibly removed
from their homes, placed in wagons, and taken to the dock where they
were forced onto steamers bound for San Francisco. !d. at 22.
The history of violence and ongoing discrimination determined the
settlement patterns of later arrivals from Asia. Japanese immigrants
created a "Nihonmachi" or "Japantown" on the edge of Seattle's
Chinatown. See Quintard Taylor, The Forging of a Black Community:
Seattle's Central District from 1870 through the Civil Rights Era 117

(1994). Much ofthis residential segregation was a product ofboth selfprotection and racially restrictive covenants that greatly limited where
Asian immigrants could settle. See id. Similar patterns of residential
segregation occurred in other parts of Washington. See Schmid, supra.
During much ofWashington's early history and well into the
second half of the 20th century, state laws severely limited economic
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opportunities for Asian immigrants. In Washington's early period, Asian
immigrants were precluded from acquiring land through Federal
Homesteading provisions, and Washington's Constitution severely limited
the right of Asian Americans to own land. See Wash. Const. Art II,
Section 33 (1889) (restricting property rights of aliens who had not
declared their intention to become citizens). In response to a growing fear
of Japanese American agricultural success, this Constitutional limit on
alien land ownership was supplemented by the 1921 Alien Land Law,
which also limited long term leases of agricultural land. Wash. Laws,
1921, Ch. 50,§§ 1-11, Wash. Rev. Stat. §§ 10581-92 (Remington 1932).
These restrictions, upheld in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923),
severely hampered the ability of Japanese Americans to succeed in
agriculture. Yet another major economic impediment was the restriction
imposed on commercial fishing that kept Asian immigrants from taking
"for sale or profit any salmon or other food or shellfish in any of the rivers
or waters ofthis state." See Lubetich v. Pollock, 6 F.2d 237. (W.D. Wash.
1925) (quoting and upholding Section 4, chapter 90, Laws 1923).
Against this backdrop of discrimination, education offered only a
limited path toward upward social mobility for the "Nisei," Americanborn children of Japanese immigrants. Although education was
emphasized, "from the eighth grade on, their performance declined for no
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ostensible reasons." Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive
History 114 (1991). A group of researchers from Stanford conducted a
series of studies from 1929-193 3 on "how Nisei were adjusting to their
environment," and besides reporting "various reasons that Nisei should not
aspire to become professionals," noted that '"there seems to be a
widespread feeling ... that white judges and jurors are prejudiced against a
Japanese lawyer."' Id. at 113-14 (citing Edward K. Strong, Jr., The
Second-Generation Japanese Problem (1934)).
Unchecked racism rendered the first generation of Japanese
immigrants unable to naturalize, politically powerless, and economically
disadvantaged by alien land laws and professional exclusion; the second
generation faced discrimination that placed limits on educational and
occupational aspirations and opportunities. Unchecked racism also led to
the removal and confinement of nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans, a
community lacking sufficient member lawyers to adequately challenge the
incarceration and its conditions. Ironically, one of the cases that tested the
legality of incarceration, Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), had
as its defendant the first Japanese American to graduate from the
University of Oregon School of Law, who was unable to obtain a job as a
lawyer. See Roger Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the
United States since 1850, at 178 (1988).
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Critically, racial discrimination against minorities in the legal
profession is not a relic of the past. See, e.g., Spokane Task Force on Race
Relations, Diversity Resource Action Packet at ii (2003), available at
http://www. spokanehumanrights. com/2003 drapfinal.doc (noting a recent
incident involving hate mail directed against African American students at
Gonzaga University School of Law). While the more overt forms of racist
discrimination of our past have lessened, many invidious sentiments have
remained, and such sentiments must be removed from the jury room.

B.

The Juror Remarks and Behavior Reflect Bias,
Which Provided a Sufficient Basis for the Trial
Court to Order a New Trial.

The jurors' behavior in this case was infected by prejudice, and not
the behavior of responsible, impartial jurors. While deliberating on the
issue of whether Dr. Stime was negligent, the jurors manifested bias
against plaintiffs' attorney Mark Kamitomo, based on his distinct Japanese
ethnicity. The jurors engaged in two distinct forms of racist behavior:
First, the jurors jokingly manipulated the Japanese American attorney's
name, which is a form of"disparagement humor." See Thomas E. Ford
and Mark A. Ferguson, Social Consequences ofDisparagement Humor: A
Prejudiced Norm Theory, 8 Personality and Social Psychology Review 79,
79 (2004) (defining disparagement humor, including racist humor, as
"humor that denigrates, belittles, or maligns an individual or social
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group"). Second, a juror made an overtly racist remark when the verdict
was being handed down on Pearl Harbor Day, noting that because of the
date, yet another instance of disparagement was "almost appropriate." (CP
113.) This remark associated Mr. Kamitomo with members of the
Japanese military who attacked Pearl Harbor, resurfacing the racial hatred
against Japanese Americans during World War II that led to their
incarceration. The juror's remark suggested that it was "appropriate" to
belittle Mr. Kamitomo due to his Japanese ancestry. This is a clear
instance of racist behavior and hateful thinking. The juror in question
associated Mr. Kamitomo with the Japanese who attacked Pearl Harbor
based solely upon his race. Even worse, the juror condemned an entire
race to punishment and spite, due to geopolitical events of the distant past.
Both types of racist behavior reflect prejudice and irresponsibility.
The disparagement humor and overtly racist remark not only
reflected underlying prejudice, but also likely entrenched the bias of the
speakers, escalated the bias of other jurors, and set a contextual norm that
prejudice could rightfully be applied in the deliberations. Expressing a
belief often solidifies the speaker's commitment to the belief. Regarding
disparagement humor in particular, researchers have found that "freely
reciting disparaging jokes can have a negative impact on an individual's
attitudes toward the target of disparagement." Karen L. Hobden and James
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M. Olson, From Jest to Antipathy: Disparagement Humor as a Source of
Dissonance-Motivated Attitude Change, 15 Basic and Applied Social
Psychology 239, 246 (1994). Thus an experimental group that was
induced to freely tell disparaging jokes about lawyers prior to
measurement reported comparatively more negative opinions about
lawyers. !d. at 245. When the jurors in this case made disparaging jokes
about Mr. Kamitomo's name, they entrenched their own prejudice.
The expression of racially prejudicial statements also escalates the
bias of others in the vicinity. One prominent study concluded that "[s]ocial
influence strongly affected reactions to racism." Fletcher A. Blanchard,
ChristianS. Crandall, John C. Brigham, and Leigh Ann Vaughn,
Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to
Interracial Settings, 79 Journal of Applied Psychology 993, 995 (1994).
When respondents were asked about racial issues, hearing someone
condone racism prior to responding "produced much more ... condoning
reactions to racism" both publicly and privately. !d. Thus when one juror
hears another condone racism and speak in a prejudicial fashion, her own
prejudice is escalated and she is more likely to condone racist behavior.
Each case of disparagement and each racist remark entrenched the bias of
the other jurors against Mr. Kamitomo. It is therefore no coincidence that
use of racial disparagement spread from one juror to another.
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The use of disparagement humor also "increases tolerance of
discriminatory events for people high in prejudice toward the disparaged
group." Ford, supra, at 79. "That is, it expands the bounds of appropriate
conduct, creating a norm of tolerance of discrimination." Id. For example,
after being exposed to sexist jokes, men in a group setting who had
already been measured high in sexism anticipated less guilt from their own
imagined sexist behavior, and had a greater tolerance for imagined sexist
behavior of others. !d. at 81. Thus exposure to sexist jokes rendered those
already sexist more open to sexist behavior in a group setting. In the same
way, once the jurors invoked racist joking, they became more open to
racist behavior and racist decision-making as jurors. Such bias should
never be allowed to become normatively acceptable within the jury room.
In sum, racist remarks in the jury room actively poison the
deliberative process by inserting prejudice into the jury's view of the
proceedings. Thus whether or not jurors are initially racially prejudiced,
they must not be allowed to manifest such bias explicitly and as a group.
Such racial prejudice is of particular concern when directed against
attorneys. The attorney represents the client to the jury. Unsurprisingly,
studies have shown that the characteristics of an attorney have influence
on jury perception and decision-making. See, e.g., Russ K.E. Espinoza,
Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, Defendant and defense attorney characteristics
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and their effects on juror decision making and prejudice against Mexican
Americans, 14 Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 364
(2008). One study in particular found that subjects judged a litigation
recording to be less persuasive if told the attorney was Asian. See Jerry
Kang, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Kumar Y ogeeswaran, and Gary Blasi, Are
Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness (July 31,
2009), (unpublished manuscript, available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442119). Because the attorney presents the
party's arguments and witnesses to the jury, a juror's bias against the
attorney is intimately tied up with the fairness of the verdict for the
represented party. Thus, although bias against anyone involved in the
proceedings raises doubts about a juror's ability to adjudicate responsibly
and accurately, bias against an attorney in particular raises a clear doubt as
to impartiality in decision-making.
In Hansen v. Lemley, 100 Wash. 444, 171 P. 255 (1918), the
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that "[p ]rejudice against client
or counsel is a thing to be inquired into" when evaluating juror bias. I d. at
448 (emphasis added). In Hansen, a juror's possible distaste for an
attorney's mustache did not warrant a new trial because the juror was
unlikely to have been substantially biased regarding "a cause so trivial and
harmless, and for a condition so easily removed." Id. In stark contrast, an
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attorney's race is not so easily removed, and provides more than ample
ground to presume juror bias, as in the present case.
In the end, such collectively irresponsible and prejudicial behavior
by jurors should not be allowed. The cost of a new trial in such cases is a
necessary burden. Yet the burden to future courts will be minimal if jurors
are adequately instructed to refrain from racist behavior and sanctioned for
willful violations. Cf, e.g.,_ State v. Hall, 40 Wash.App. 162, 168, 697
P .2d 597 (1985) (juror was in contempt and fined for conduct in violation
of duties). The jurors in this case were told that they were "officers of
th[ e] court," and instructed to "act impartially with an earnest desire to
reach a proper verdict." (C.P. at 14.) Sadly, some of the jurors ignored
these instructions. Thankfully jurors Marchant and Costigan did come
forward to reveal the unacceptable behavior of the jury, fulfilling their
duties as officers of the court.

C.
Failure to Provide a Remedy for Juror
Misconduct Will Increase and Entrench the
Disadvantage of Minorities in the Legal Profession.
The legal profession has been notoriously resistant to assimilation
of minority groups, and the effects of that resistance endure. For much of
the last century, law schools restricted admissions based upon race and
ethnicity, among other characteristics. James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds
and Moral Seismography, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 781, 811 (1997). At the
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same time the American Bar Association, as well as state and local bar
associations, confined their membership in order to exclude Jews, Blacks,
and other minorities. Id. at 811-14. Immigrant Asians in particular
suffered greatly from such exclusion, as they were completely denied the
right to practice law due to their ineligibility for naturalization. Kiyoko
Kamio Knapp, Disdain ofAlien Lawyers: History ofExclusion, 7 Seton
Hall Const. L.J. 103, 127-28 (1996). The Supreme Court ofWashington
thus concluded that a native from Japan was ineligible for admission to the
bar. In re Yamashita, 30 Wash. 234, 238, 70 P. 482 (1902). The Court
reached this decision despite commenting that Mr. Yamashita had "the
requisite learning and ability qualifying him for admission." Id. at 234.
Sadly this strict requirement of U.S. citizenship remained in force until
1971. See In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wn.2d 561, 488 P.2d 259 (1971).
Although such direct and blatantly racist exclusion of minorities is
thankfully a somewhat distant memory, minorities in the legal profession
-including Asian Americans in particular- still remain starkly
underrepresented in the legal profession and subject to discrimination. The
following table depicts minority and Asian representation in the bar:
Minority and Asian Underrepresentation in the Legal Profession 1

1

Data drawn from Gita Z. Wilder, The Road to Law School and Beyond 3-4 (2003);
American Bar Association, Goal III Report: The State ofRacial and Ethnic Diversity 3
(2009); GeorgeS. Bridges, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Differences in the Washington

14

1990, u.s.
2000, U.S.
1988-90, WA
2008, WA

Minorities
Overall
24.4%
24.9%
15.7%
23.8%

Minority
Lawyers
7.6%
9.7%
7%
7.1%

Asians
Overall
2.7%
4.2%
4.4%
6.9%

Asian
Lawyers
1.4%
2.3%
2%
1.8%

These statistics reflect minority and Asian representation that is woefully
inadequate. Minority underrepresentation nationally and in Washington
stems in part from historical discrimination by jurors, clients, and firms.
In a rare showing of candor, law firm representatives informed one
minority applicant that "minorities were not viewed favorably by clients,
and were not capable of bringing any business to firms, therefore they
were not an asset." Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias
in the Judicial System, Access to Representation and Interaction, and
General Civil Process, 16 Hamline L. Rev. 665, 678 (1993). In the past,
law firms would often justify refusal to hire Jews by blaming the prejudice
of clients, Molitemo, supra at 814, and there are numerous examples of
such discrimination being based upon fears of juror bias. See, e.g., Elina
Tetelbaum, Check Your Identity-Baggage at the Firm Door: The Ethical
Difficulty ofZealous Advocacy in Bias-Ridden Courtrooms, 14 Tex. J.
Bar: Results from the 1988 Washington State Bar Survey, 2 (1990); Wash. State Office of
Fin. Mgmt., Race and Minority Infmmationfor the State and Counties (2004)
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/race/comparison.asp; Letter from Chach Duarte White to
Board of Governors at 5 (February 18, 2009), in FOURTHANNUALSTATEWIDEDIVERSITY
CONFERENCE (Seattle University 2009).
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C.L. & C.R. 261, 267 (2009) ("we all decided not to use a Jewish lawyer
when we knew prejudice against him existed").
A survey oflawyers in 1963 by the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights reported "it is often impossible for a Negro lawyer to subsist
professionally in smaller towns. Added to this is the problem, related by
many of the Negro respondents, that Negro clients often seek out white
lawyers because ... they feel that Negro lawyers are at a disadvantage
against a white adversary and before a white judge and jury." U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Civil Rights '63 119 (1963). These same
sentiments remain relevant today: a survey of the general population in
Arkansas found that "asked their racial preference for attorneys ...
[r]esponses were almost evenly split between those who said they would
use a white attorney and those who said that either race was acceptable."
Robert L. Brown and Sheila Campbell, How the Public Views Female and

Black Attorneys, 32 Ark. Law. 22, 28 (1997). The same survey found that
a "majority ofblack respondents indicated that white attorneys were taken
more seriously by juries than black attorneys." I d.; cf Victoria Tran,

Working With Asian Clients, 21 GPSolo 38, 39 (2004) ("Some Asian
clients also believe that non-Asian attorneys are inherently better attorneys
because they do not speak with an accent as do many Asian attorneys.").
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The resolution of this case will have substantial implications for
the minority bar. The proceedings so far have already been well
documented in both the local and national press? Thus the Court's
decision will signal to a general public of prospective clients, as well as to
lawyers and law firms, either that potentially damning racist juror conduct
will be tolerated, or that such prejudicial behavior will not be allowed.
If such conduct is allowed, a client will be forced either to make a
racially-motivated decision in hiring an attorney, or to face a jury that
could be potentially biased by overt racist behavior directed against his
minority attorney. One commentator aptly explained why the legal market
would invariably reflect renewed client discrimination in law firm hiring
and staffing:
First, the market may simply satisfy a "taste" for discrimination
held by consumers. If a client feels subtly more confident having a
White male attorney over an Asian female attorney as the lead
lawyer for mission-critical litigation, then an unhindered market
will just as subtly satisfy that request. Second, such preferences
may produce self-fulfilling prophecies in the form of positive
feedback loops that cause underinvestment in human capital and
potentially disrupt performance on ability tests. Third, ... there
would be a collective action problem in dismantling the feedback
2

See, e.g., Karen Dom Steele, Spokane lawyer claims jurors' racial bias hurt client, The
Spokesman Review (January 15, 2008), available at
http://www. spokesmanreview. com/tools/story_pf. asp ?ID=2277 4 5; see also
http:/lseattletimes.nwsource.com/htmVlocalnews/2004126632_webjury15m.html (Seattle
Times);
http://blog.oregonlive.com/breakingnews/2008/0 I/attorney_seeks_new_trial_over.html
(The Oregonian);
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/new_trial_sought_afterjurors_mock_lawyers_heritage
(The ABA Journal).
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loop because a single firm cannot alter the general incentive
structures created by the general marketplace.
Jerry Kang, Race.Net Neutrality, 6 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 1, 15
(2007). And at least one legal ethicist has stated that if a client seeks to
staff attorneys in a racist fashion, a law firm is obligated to comply. See
Richard H. Underwood & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Modern Litigation and

Professional Responsibility Handbook 345-46 (2001). Similarly, law firms
seeking to maximize their results will be faced with the same dilemma
when they make decisions about how to staff cases regardless of expressed
client preferences.
Forcing clients into a disturbing choice between the possibility of
an explicitly biased jury on the one hand, and racist hiring decisions on the
other, would certainly violate basic notions of equal protection and due
process. Either way, allowing racist conduct in the jury room would
significantly magnify the negative effect of juror bias on the minority bar.

D. Minority Communities Would Likely Suffer If Minorities
Became Further Disadvantaged in the Legal Profession.
Minorities in the legal profession play a special role in society at
large, not only by promoting the values of diversity and equality, but also
by helping to ensure that otherwise underserved persons and communities
gain access to the legal system. Increased diversity in the legal profession
initially provides the appearance of fair representation of society at large.
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Paul Andrew Burnett, Fairness, Ethical, and Historical Reasons for
DiversifYing the Legal Profession, 71 UMKC L. Rev. 127, 129-34 (2002)
(analyzing the benefits of a diverse legal profession). Notably, minorities
in the legal profession also have a history of disproportionately aiding
minority communities in need. For example, one survey of attorneys
revealed that Black lawyers served disproportionately in civil rights cases
during the early 1960s. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Civil Rights '63
at 118 (1963). And a recent study found that minorities are more likely to
serve minority clients. See David L. Chambers, Richard 0. Lempert, &
Terry K. Adams, Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River
Runs Through Law School, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 395,401 (2000).
The legal community needs "lawyers who are culturally sensitive
and proficient in clients' languages." Rebecca Porter, Diversity Challenges
in the Legal Profession, Conference Finds, 35 Trial82, 82 (1999). Thus if
this court allows racial bias to further infect the legal profession, the
impact will be felt not only by minority attorneys themselves, but also by
the communities in need that they may no longer be able to serve.

IV. CONCLUSION
The verdict in this case was tainted by unacceptable bias and
prejudice. Within the context of a long history of discrimination against
Japanese and other Asian Americans, the use of disparagement humor and
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overtly racist remarks against a Japanese American attorney was
irresponsible, offensive, and prejudicial. This type of behavior by jurors is
never acceptable, and should be rejected.

To ensure that prospective parties are not forced to either make
racist hiring decisions or face the possibility of an unchecked racist jury,
and also to ensure that minorities in the legal profession are not
substantially impaired by clients' fear of juror bias, this Court should
affirm the grant of a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lOth day of SEPTEMBER, 2009.
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Appendix A: Detailed Amici Statements of Identity and Interest
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (Korematsu
Center) is a non-profit organization based at Seattle University School of
Law that works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and
education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing the legacy of
Fred Korematsu, who defied the military orders during World War II that
ultimately led to the internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans. He took
his challenge of the military orders to the United States Supreme Court,
which upheld his conviction in 1944 on the ground that the removal of
Japanese Americans was justified by "military necessity." Fred Korematsu
went on to successfully challenge his conviction and to champion the
cause of civil liberties and civil rights for all people. The Korematsu
Center, inspired by his example, works to advance his legacy by
promoting social justice for all. It has a special interest in promoting
fairness in the courts of our country. That interest includes ensuring that
effective remedies exist to address juror bias, which might otherwise lead
not only to unfairness in this specific case but also to diminished
opportunities for minority lawyers with a resulting negative impact on
diversity in the legal profession. The Korematsu Center does not, in this
brief or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University.
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The Asian Bar Association ofWashington (ABAW) is the
professional association of Asian Pacific American attorneys, judges, law
professors and law students that strives to be a network for its members in
Washington State. Created in 1987, ABAW advocates for the legal needs
and interests for the AP A community, and represents over 200 AP A
attorneys in a wide-range of practice areas. It is a local affiliate of the
National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAP ABA). Through
its network of committees, ABAW monitors legislative developments and
judicial appointments, rates judicial candidates and advocates for equal
opportunity and builds coalitions with other organizations within the legal
profession and in the community at large. The ABAW also addresses
crises faced by our members and the broader Asian and Pacific Islander
community in Washington. The founders created the ABAW precisely to
address issues like the ones presented in this appeal.
The South Asian Bar Association ofWashington (SABAW) is a
professional association of attorneys, law professors, judges and law
students involved in issues impacting the South Asian community in
Washington state. Created in 2001, SABAW provides pro bono legal
services to the community, engages in outreach and education efforts,
monitors the rights of its membership, and provides financial assistant to
law students and practicing attorneys. SABAW also builds coalitions with
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other professional organizations sharing the goals of equal opportunity and
access to justice. SABAW is strongly interested in issues surrounding the
perception of its membership in the legal system.
Washington Women Lawyers (WWL) is a statewide professional
association of attorneys, judges, law professors and law students. The
principal purposes of Washington Women Lawyers are to further the full
integration of women in the legal profession and to promote equal rights
and opportunities for women and to prevent discrimination against them.
WWL offers programming and support for women lawyers throughout the
state through the combined resources of a statewide organization and a
network of local chapters. Through its membership, WWL provides
public support, education to lawyers and the lay public, and services to
local communities throughout the state on matters of access to justice and
issues concerning women and children. Through a network of state and
local chapters, WWL provides judicial ratings and encourages qualified
candidates who are sensitive to women's issues both within the profession
and under the law, to seek and obtain positions of responsibility and
stature within the legal profession and community in general. Because of
its diverse membership and diverse community activities, WWL is acutely
aware that for fairness and justice to exist for women and children, many
ofwhom are members of minority groups in the community, courts must
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continue to be mindful of circumstances where discrimination and
disenfranchisement could impact the parties or their legal counsel.
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